2006 FEATURED SHORT STORY

Technology wonders by Andrey Prokopyev

2005 FEATURED SHORT STORY

The Elfking's Bride by Karen Bembry

2004 FEATURED SHORT STORY

The Phoenix Procedure by Scott W Roberts

Previously Featured Short stories:

Running... a thriller
A Devoted Friend .. A story about a dangerous friend and one woman's struggle to face her worst enemy, herself. It's a worth while story to take the time to read.
Vampyr ..A dairy based off the novels by Ann Rice..
Farewell ..Ever wonder how you would live your life if everyone was killed and you for some reason were spared to live out your days?
Lynn Warden's Secret .. There is only one way to find out..
INITIATION Follow Matthew into the darkness..
Bad Awake Karen is running for her life.. find out why..

MAGAZINES:

La Luna International Writer's Magazine

BOOKS ON THE SHELF:

The Library

The Mascots

A Socratic Dialogue on Piety, Impiety and the Laws
Kimberly Shadowrose
Bryon, Georiga

Setting: On the steps of King Archon's court. Euthyphro is walking away. Socrates recognizes Toby, a wandering Athenian sophist, and calls out to him.

Socrates: Toby, my good man, what's new with you? Have you business in King Archon's court, as I do?

Toby: Oh no, I'm simply passing through. Tell me, what brings you to this court? Are you bringing charges, or answering them? I hope you're the one bringing charges, because I've never known you to give straight answers.

Socrates: It appears I have been indicted. The one bringing charges they call Meletus; he belongs to the Pitthean deme. I myself don't really know the man, but I am told he has long hair, a short beard, and an aquiline nose. Do you know the man?

Toby: I'm afraid I do not know him. Tell me, is he one of the many you've antagonized over the years?

Socrates: I do not believe I've run across Meletus before. He says that the young men of Athens are corrupted, and that he knows who corrupts them. He is likely to be wise, and when he sees that I know nothing, he takes steps to protect the youth from my influence (Euthyphro 2c-3a).

Toby: How do you corrupt them, Socrates?

Socrates: According to Meletus, I show and teach impiety to the gods. As you may have seen, I just spoke with my friend Euthyphro about this very subject, piety and impiety, and I am left still very confused about the matter. Perhaps you, if you are willing, can teach me what it is to be pious or impious?

Toby: Socrates, you do not know what piety is? I know what piety is, and I can tell you. Piety is what the people believe piety to be. The general consensus makes things pious or impious.

Socrates: So you are telling me that piety is not the will of the gods? Is that what you say?

Toby: That is exactly what I say.

Socrates: But the people say that things are pious or impious depending on whether the gods love or hate those very things. If the people determine what is pious and impious, does that mean the people are gods?

Toby: No, that is not what I say. The people are certainly not gods.

Socrates: Then what is it you mean to say? Do you mean that the people interpret the will of the gods, and thus what is pious and impious? Do the gods speak to the people?

Toby: I think that is much closer to my meaning.

Socrates: Then the people do not determine what is pious and impious at all, but only reflect the will of the gods, as a messenger conveys a message. I recall speaking with my friend Meno about this very subject, only we were discussing virtue and not piety. In that conversation, we came to the conclusion that virtue is a matter of right opinion, a gift from the gods, not unlike prophecy. Let's examine whether or not piety is teachable, and thus whether it is knowledge or some other gift from the gods.

Toby: This examination would be a good thing, since I do not yet understand why piety would be like virtue.

Socrates: Let me ask you this, and perhaps you can answer, who are teachers of piety?

Toby: The people teach their young what is pious and what is impious.

Socrates: Is it possible that a person who was pious could have a child who is impious?

Toby: It is possible.

Socrates: Surely those who are experts in piety would teach their children how to be pious, or would make sure that other people who are skilled in piety taught their children how to be pious, would they not?

Toby: They surely would.

Socrates: Then it must follow that they are not able to teach piety to their offspring and therefore piety is not teachable. If piety were knowledge, then it would be teachable; if piety is not teachable, then it cannot be knowledge. Surely a person would not willingly be impious, as they would bring harm upon themselves by doing so. As a result, one may conclude that, like virtue, piety would also be a gift from the gods.

Toby: That seems to me a very fine answer, but does this gift belong to the majority of people, or to the chosen few? For my part, I think the majority lays claim to this gift.

Socrates: I should hope that were so, Toby, for I fear I shall be judged before many people, and not by a few, but I cannot rest with that answer. First of all, I don't believe most people are concerned with notions like piety or justice, but rather with the tangible things of this world, things like money, reputation, and the upbringing of children; only the few, men like you and me, really ask whether something is right or wrong for its own sake.

Toby: You are too pessimistic about human nature, Socrates.

Socrates: Let us examine if piety, like virtue could be a matter of right opinion, my dear Toby. For purposes of demonstration, is it possible for two people to disagree about matters of fact? For example, I recall there is a basket of grapes on my table at home. If you did not recall seeing the basket of grapes there, but in fact recalled a basket of olives in the same place, might we not disagree about what occupies that table, grapes or olives?

Toby: We might disagree, yes.

Socrates: Perhaps neither you nor I tasted what was in the basket. I saw things that I thought were grapes. You saw perhaps the very same things, but you concluded they were olives.

Socrates: For the moment, we shall set aside the chance that I might speak falsely by design.

Toby: I could hardly think you possible of such deception, Socrates. You are too honest!

Socrates: Too honest for my own good, I fear, but let us return to the argument. If two people can disagree about the object now present on my table, could they not disagree about those messages given by the gods? Could the same action be both right and wrong at the same time, or looking to the gods, both pious and impious? Answer, my dear Toby, if you know.

Toby: Surely both opinions could not be right at the same time.

Socrates: Then the majority of people, who may disagree with each other about what is pious and impious, cannot lay claim to right opinion where the gods are concerned?

Toby: Apparently not. Perhaps piety belongs to the few, the oracles and the prophets.

Socrates: Are the few of whom you speak always in agreement? Might not the few also be confused or mistaken? I would like to believe Oracles have this right opinion, like virtue a gift from the gods. Certainly my own experience has proven the Oracle at Delphi true, though I could hardly believe its prophecy.

Toby: The few could also disagree. Perhaps they listen to different gods, and therefore form different opinions. That could explain the disagreement, even among those few who hear the will of the gods with clarity.

Socrates: My dear Toby, your proposal only muddies the waters further! If the gods are in disagreement concerning the nature of piety, then we must attribute to them the same weakness we mortals bear, namely our imperfect opinions. Such an idea seems most impious to me, unless...

Toby: Unless what, Socrates?

Socrates: During our conversation, Euthyphro and I struck an obstacle that we never quite resolved. Are things pious because they are loved by the gods, or are things loved by the gods because they are pious. To be pious and to be god-loved seem to me two different things entirely.

Toby: Why should this difference matter?

Socrates: If things are pious because they are loved by the gods, then something may be both pious and impious at the same time, depending on which god observes the action. But if things are loved by the gods because they are pious, then piety is not determined by the gods, but merely observed and loved by them

Toby: If the latter is true, then the gods could be confused about piety, just as mortals are.

Socrates: The gods could be confused if they received their understanding of piety by way of right opinion, as we apparently do, and not by knowledge, but I would not presume to know what the gods believe and what they know, for I am merely Socrates the subject of the gods, and not Socrates the Bringer of Lightning.

Toby: I think you have brought some small enlightenment to this world, Socrates, though like the lightning far too brief.

Socrates: You do me too much honor, Toby, but look where we have come! You started out saying piety is defined by the will of the people, but now you say that piety is something determined not even by the gods, but merely observed and loved by them in their blessed state.

Toby: So it seems, Socrates. I have often thought that standing on my head could make our conversations more bearable.

Socrates: Perhaps you're right, Toby, but bear with me to the end. I'm still no closer to an understanding of piety and impiety, and without understanding piety I fear I will speak poorly against the charges brought by one as wise as Meletus.

Toby: What do the laws say about piety? Surely if the laws of Athens can condemn one for impiety, those same laws must contain within them some right opinion about piety.

Socrates: If the people write the laws, wouldn't the general confusion about right opinion be reflected in the laws they write? And if the gods, they must still speak through the people who write the laws, and therefore the gods' knowledge of piety may be lost in translation.

Toby: If we cannot be sure that the laws concerning piety reflect right opinion about what is pious and impious, what business does the city have in making such laws, let alone enforcing those laws? Why not flee to another city? Laws that cannot define what they condemn are hardly good laws, and no one would fault you for escaping an unjust law.

Socrates: Toby, what you are suggesting is pure chaos. Are you suggesting that an individual should override the laws of the city, if the laws do not agree with him? Surely that would be the most profound example of impiety, and then I would be found guilty of the accusations brought by Meletus!

Toby: What do you mean by this?

Socrates: Whether the law is clear in its meaning or just in its application, the city and I have reached an agreement. I have a duty to uphold the laws of the city and the verdicts of the court, lest the city be destroyed at the will of private individuals. I must believe my opinion to be right, and my opinion says that to break my word to the city would be impious. That is my duty to the very piety that the gods love, and I will not go against what I believe to be right.

Toby: You are a man of great character, Socrates, and a mascot of the city. I would like to continue this conversation, but I am meeting my good friend Mizar this afternoon; we are going to see the new gymnasium built by Statesman Kirby. I wish you well, Socrates.

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